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THE FTC FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE RULE 

AND ITS IMPACT ON CHAPTER 93A OF 

THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS­





L. SETH STADFELD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 21, 1978, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
promulgated a trade regulation rule! and a supporting statement of 
basis and purpose (hereafter the FTC Rule) in response to vivid ev­
idence of widespread deceptive and unfair conduct in connection 
with the sale of business opportunities (franchises).2 The purpose of 
this paper is to explore the impact of the FTC Rule on the devel­
oping law in Massachusetts under chapter 93A.3 
Informed consumers and businesspersons are important to the 
fair and effective functioning of a free market economy.4 The FTC 
Rule requires disclosure of material information to prospective con­
sumers of business opportunities. It is based on the thesis that 
such consumers lack the necessary information to make an in­
formed investment decision. 5 The statement of basis and purpose 
upon which the FTC Rule is premised contains many important in­
terpretations of section 5(a)(1)6 of the Federal Trade Commission 
* Associate in the law firm of Brown, Prifti, Leighton and Cohen, Boston, Mass. 
A.B., Brown University, 1973; J.D. Boston University School of Law, 1976. 
1. "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and 
Business Opportunity Ventures" 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1978) (Trade Regulation Rule and 
Statement of Basis and Purpose). This rule was promulgated by the FTC pursuant to 
its rulemaking authority under 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976). 
2. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,623-27 (1978). 
3. Chapter 93A is entitled, "Regulation of Business Practices for Consumers 
Protection." It provides in pertinent part: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby 
declared unlawful." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 1972). This is the 
heart of the statute which has remained unchanged since its 1967 enactment. 1967 
Mass. Acts ch. 813, § 1. 
4. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer P-rQtection and the Regulation of Adver­
tising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 671 n.34 (1977). 
5. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,625 (1978). 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I)-(6) (1976). 
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Act (FTCA) as applied in the franchising context. These interpreta­
tions stand as instructive and authoritative Massachusetts prece­
dent. 7 They are wholly incorporated into the body of Massa­
chusetts common and administrative lawS now developing under 
chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws. As will be shown, 
the FTC Rule's application should not be limited to franchising and 
should, when appropriate, apply to many other facets of trade and 
commerce. In addition, it provides a variety of useful and func­
tional suggestions for commercial operators who wish to deal hon­
estly, fairly, and profitably, yet remain free from violation of the 
statute. 
In order to understand fully the meaning of the law embodied 
in chapter 93A and highlighted by the FTC Rule, this article re­
views certain substantive and procedural rules now firmly estab­
lished under that statute. The article then explores the nature, 
scope, background and impact of the FTC Rule in Massachusetts. 
In· this connection, the following will be considered: the sub­
stantive provisions of the FTC Rule and their effect on state fran­
chise laws; the impact of the FTC Rule on Massachusetts law un­
der chapter 93A; applicability of the FTC Rule to commercial 
transactions exclusive of franchising; and suggestions for compli­
ance. 
II. CHAPTER 93A 
The FTC Rule is important because it stands as persuasive 
precedent for conduct to which chapter 93A applies. Within the 
context of business disputes, the FTC Rule represents the most 
significant injection of precedent into the body of law developing 
under chapter 93A since its 1967 enactment. Chapter 93A prohibits 
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac­
tices in trade or commerce. 9 Such conduct includes antitrust viola­
tions, incipient antitrust violations and lesser types of anticom­
petitive conduct. 10 In addition, it forbids fraud, deceit, misrepre­
7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (West 1972), provides: 

It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph (a) of this sec­

tion the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal 

Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section S(a)(I) of the Federal 

Trade Commission Act (IS U.S.C. § 4S(a)(l) (1973)), as from time to time 
amended. 
8. Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 694 n.8, 322 N.E.2d 768, 773 
n.8 (197S). 
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 1972). See note 3 supra. 
10. FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 
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sentation, unfair competition, deception, oppression and 
unconscionable activities in the commercial context. 11 Further­
more, it should apply when a contracting party fails to deal fairly 
and in good faith. 12 
This vast substantive coverage exists for the benefit of 
Massachusetts consumers13 and businesspersons14 who may bring 
private suits for violations of either the statute or the regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General. 15 The Attorney General also 
may seek redress for such violations. IS The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has recently17 approved a regulation of general ap­
316 (1966); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948). The commercial law practi ­
tioner must familiarize himself or herself with the rules governing anticompetitive 
conduct to understand fully the monumental sweep of ch. 93A. 
11. See PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596, 321 
N.E.2d 915, 917 (1975) (Tauro, C.J.) (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 
U.S. 233, 244 (1972)). See also note 109 supra for a discussion of factors in de­
termining if an act or practice is unfair. 
12. 	 Druker v. Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1408, 1411, 348 

N.E.2d 763, 765 (1976). [I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that 

neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or 

injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, 

which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing. 

[d.; accord, Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., [1979] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 62,869, 
at 79,019 (7th Cir. 1979); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1569,364 N.E.2d 125 (1977). For treatment similar to that given in Massachusetts in 
other states with "little FTC Acts," see, e.g., Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 
Wash. 2d 355, 358-59, 581 P.2d 1349, 1351 (1978) where the Washington Supreme 
Court indicated that a violation of the duty of good faith in commerce may be a per 
se violation of that state's "little FTC Act." 
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9 (West 1972). 
14. [d. § 11. 
15. [d. § 2(c). The Massachusetts Attorney General has promulgated many reg­
ulations under ch. 93A and a complete text thereof may be obtained at the State 
House in Boston. They may also be found in 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3.01-.18 (1979). 
Regulations of a general nature to protect consumer purchasers and tenants have 
been promulgated. Additionally, regulations specifically covering the nursing home 
industry, motor vehicle advertising, retail advertising and debt collection practices 
have been promulgated and are in effect. Most of these regulations are quite broad. 
The constitutionality of the regulations has not yet been ruled upon by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 
'16. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 4-8 (West 1972). 
17. Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 2856-57, 382 
N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (1978), where the following regulation of general applicability re­
specting ch. 93A violations was upheld. 
Without limiting the scope of any other rule, regulation or statute, an act or 
practice is a violation of Chapter 93A, section 2 if: A) It is oppressive or oth­
erwise unconscionable in any respect; or B) Any person or other legal entity 
subject to this act fails to disclose to a buyer or prospective buyer any fact, 
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plicability which rendered unlawful a failure to disclose a material 
fact to a buyer. Although these regulations promulgated by the At­
torney General were designed to apply in the consumer context, 
they also have been held to apply to transactions between 
businesspersons. IS Enforcers of the statute now may rely on the 
FTC Rule, and particularly on the statement of basis and purpose, 
as another standard for use in achieving commercial good faith and 
fair dealing. 
There are many remedies available for violation of chapter 
93A. Equitable relief is available if suit is brought in the superior 
or housing court. 19 Damages may be recovered in the superior, 
district or housing court departments of the trial court. 20 Class ac­
tions21 may be brought under standards which are easier to satisfy 
than those embodied in either the Massachusetts or Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 22 Moreover, to provide the incentive for pri­
vate enforcement and to encourage compliance, multiple damages, 
costs and attorneys' fees may be awarded to a victorious plaintiff. 23 
On showing a willful violation, the court must award at least two, 
but not more than three, times the actual damages. 24 
the disclosure of which may have influenced the buyer or prospective buyer 
not to enter into the transaction .... 
Attorney General's Rules and Regulations, 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3.16 (1979) (empha­
sis added). 
18. Public Works Supply Co. v. Stewart & Prince, Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 870 (1977). 
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11 (West 1972). 
20. Id. Regarding Housing Court jurisdiction over ch. 93A claims, see 1979 
Mass. Acts ch. 72, (overruling Chakrabbarti v. Marco S. Marinello Assoc., 79 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 537, 386 N.E.2d 1248 (1979)). Redress under ch. 93A is also available in 
small claims court for damages under $750. Trebling of such loss may be ordered by 
the court and recoveries pursuant thereto in excess of $750 may be realized. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 21 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
21. Both FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(a) require: (1) that the 
class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) that there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) that the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of those of the class; and (4) that the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. These require­
ments must also be satisfied under ch. 93A. See, e.g., Karedes v. Cities Servo Oil Co., 
No. 19731 (Mass. Suffolk Super. Ct., Dec. 7, 1979) (Doerfer, J.). 
22. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11 (West 1972). It is unnecessary to 
show· that class issues "predominate" over individual considerations and that the 
class suit is "superior" to other methods for adjudication of the controversy. See 
Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3188, 337 N.E.2d 701 (1975); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). See also Bernstein & Berger, Recent Developments in Pri­
vate Antitrust Class Actions, 24 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 819 (1979). 
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11 (West 1972). 
24. [d. In consumer suits multiple damages must also be awarded to a con­
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Chapter 93A is a plaintiff's statute. It embodies new substan­
tive rights which were, practically speaking, unavailable at com­
mon law. With the exception of certain rarely occurring transac­
tions which are exempted,25 the vast substantive coverage and 
potent remedies of chapter 93A are eminently available. It is the 
effective tool which the courts, the administrative agencies, the At­
torney General and the private litigants may use "to discover and 
make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the 
conscience of the community may progressively develop. "26 
sumer plaintiff if the defendant's refusal to grant relief upon written demand was 
made in bad faith or with reason to know that its conduct violated the statute. For an 
enlightening discussion of factors for consideration in assessing multiple damages 
and attorneys' fees, see McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagon, Inc., No. 77-752-S (D. 
Mass., Nov. 7, 1979); Linthicum v. Archambault, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2661, 398 N.E.2d 
482; Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp. (1979), 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 
1065 (1978); McLaughlin v. Disarro, 79 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 136, 385 N.E.2d 524 
(1979). In McGinty the plaintiff proved that the defendants misrepresented certified' 
odometer mileage (26,000 instead of 126,000 miles) and under ch. 93A recovered 
judgment in the amount of $1,444.75 and attorney's fees of $1,000. Having found that 
plaintiffs' counsel worked on the case for 228 hours, the court awarded legal fees 
equal to less than 20% of that requested. The court also found that plaintiffs' counsel 
expended extra time because of the defendant's delays in responding to discovery. 
In support of such award, the court stated: "Even when the statute is remedial and 
plaintiffs' attorney is in the position of a private attorney general, however, some rea­
sonable cost-benefit relationship should be observed. The remedial aspect of these 
statutes is not directed to the economic hardships of lawyers." McGinty v. Beranger 
Volkswagon, Inc., No. 77-752-S, at 4 (D. Mass., Nov. 7, 1979) (emphasis added). 
Query as to whether the liberal provisions for awarding attorney's fees under ch. 93A 
have been judiCially repealed? Cases like McGinty give consumer counsel little in­
centive to take consumer cases. Compare Linthicum v. Archambault, 79 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2661, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979) (breach of contract on rental of home). In addition to 
declaring factors which should be considered in assessing attorneys' fees under § II, 
(e.g. nature of case and issues presented, re'sult obtained, amount involved, time and 
labor expended, reputation, ability and experience of counsel, and the price usually 
charged in the area for similar services) the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
stated that in order to vindicate the policies of ch. 93A reasonable expert witness 
fees should normally be rec~verable. Id. at 26, 398 N.E.2d at 488. See generally 
Brown, Calculation of Attorneys' Fees: Franchise and Antitrust Relief, 2 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 297 (1979). 
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 3 (West 1972). See Boston Super Tools 
inc. v. R.W. Technologies, Inc., 7 MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 652 (D. Mass. 1979) (Caffrey, 
C.].). The burden of proving the exemption is on the party claiming it. Id. 
26. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.), 
rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. II2 (1937). The FTC's order was upheld. Common­
wealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234,316 N.E.2d 748 (1974) (citing 86 F.2d at 692, rev'd 
on other grounds, 302 U.S. at 112). 
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III. THE FTC RULE 
By requmng the disclosure of material facts about the 
franchisor, the franchised business, and terms of the franchise 
agreement, the FTC has tried to equalize the informational 
imbalance which exists between prospective franchisees and 
franchisors. Material information contained in a disclosure state­
ment of required form and substance, must be disseminated before 
a sale is consummated. 27 There is no federal registration require­
ment, though such information with substantiation must be made 
available to the FTC upon request. Although factual disclosure is 
regulated, the FTC Rule does not prescribe FTC regulation of the 
franchise relationship. As a result, the FTC Rule cannot be ex­
pected ~o eliminate completely all the injuries caused by abusive 
conduct Ion the part of franchisors. It is merely the disclosure as­
pect of a regulatory scheme designed for the protection of prospec­
tive consumer entrepreneurs. It is a seminal step in society's de­
velopment of business rules for the unsophisticated businessperson. 
A. Coverage 
Although the FTC Rule is broadly applicable to many con­
sumer and commercial transactions, it is specifically designed to 
cover continuing commercial franchise relationships28 between so­
phisticated commercial operators and unsophisticated buyers of 
small businesses. These relationships typically possess the following 
characteristics: (1) The franchisee markets goods or services under 
the franchisor's mark or name which meet the franchisor's quality 
standards; (2) the franchisor exercises significant control over, or 
gives the franchisee significant assistance in, the franchisee's opera­
tions; and (3) the franchisee pays the franchisor or its affiliate a fee 
($500 plus) within six moriths after the franchisee opens for busi­
27. It is an unfair or deceptive practice to fail to furnish a prospective offeree 
with the required information in an accurate and clearly written document at the 
earlier of the first personal meeting or the "time for making of disclosures." 16 
C.F.R. § 436.1(a) (1979). Such "time" is the earlier of ten business days prior to the 
execution of a franchise agreement (or other similar binding obligation) or the fur­
nishing by said offeree of any consideration in connection with the opportunity of­
fered. ld. at 436.2(g). 
28. Section 436.2(a) sets forth the definition of a franchise. This would usually 
include a grant of a right to do business, pursuant to a marketing plan, in connection 
with a commercial symbol, (trademark, servicemark, logo-type, etc.) of the franchisor/ 
offeror and for which the franchisee pays a fee to the franchisor. Id. at § 436.2(a). See 
CAL. DEP'T OF CORPS., REPORT TO THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON FRANCHISES OF THE 
ASSEMBLY FINANCE INSURANCE AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE AND SENATE INSUR­
ANCE AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS COMMITTEE, 15-17 (1977). 
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ness. Alternatively, the franchise relationship may possess other 
characteristics: (1) The franchisee markets goods or services sup­
plied by the franchisor or its affiliate; (2) the franchisor secures re­
tail outlets or accounts, or vending machine or rack display loca­
tions for the franchisee or provides the franchisee the services of a 
person able to do either; and (3) the franchisee pays the franchisor 
or its affiliate a fee ($500 plus) within six months after the fran­
chisee opens for business. Whether or not a business relationship 
fits within the above "franchise" definitions, it is covered by the 
FTC Rule if it is initially represented as a franchise or similar op­
portunity.29 
B. Information Required To Be Disclosed 
Information falling within the following categories must be dis­
closed in understandable language to the prospective buyer of a 
business opportunity:3o (1) Identifying information about the 
franchisor; (2) business experience of the franchisor's directors and 
key executives; (3) business experience of the franchisor and its 
parent; (4) litigation history of the franchisor and its directors and 
key executives; (5) bankruptcy history of the franchisor and its di­
rectors and key executives; (6) description of the franchise; (7) 
money required to be paid by the franchisee to obtain or com­
mence the franchised operation; (8) continuing expenses of the 
franchisee in operating the franchised business that are payable in 
whole or in part to the franchisor, directly or indirectly, or to an 
affiliate; (9) a list of persons, including the franchisor or any of its 
affiliates with whom the franchisee is required or advised to do 
business; (10) realty, personalty or services which the franchisee is 
required to purchase, lease or rent, and a list of any persons with 
whom such transactions must be made; (11) description of consider­
ation paid, such as royalties or commissions, by third parties to the 
franchisor or any of its affiliates as a result of a franchisee's pur­
chase from such third parties; (12) description of any franchisor as­
sistance in financing the purchase of a franchise; (13) restrictions 
placed on a franchisee's conduct of its business; (14) required per­
sonal participation by the franchisee, or if the franchisee is not an 
individual, the participation required by franchisee's principal or 
principals; (15) description of significant contract rights including 
termination, cancellation, renewal, transferability and competition 
29. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)(5) (1979). 
30. Id. at § 436.1 (1979). 
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rights of the franchisee; (16) statistical information about the num­
ber of franchisees and their rates of and reasons for termination, 
failure and reacquisition; (17) franchisor's right to select or approve 
a site for the franchise; (18) training programs for the franchisee; 
(19) celebrity involvement with the franchise; and (20) financial in­
formation about the franchisor. Moreover, if representations are 
made about profitability or the earnings potential of an offering, 
the FTC Rule calls for disclosure of that information through use of 
a specific form and substance. 
The purpose of the FTC Rule is to force disclosure of all infor­
mation the consumer-entrepreneur would need in making a ra­
tional investment decision about a proffered opportunity. Failure to 
furnish such information in timely fashion and proper form is an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of section 5 
of the FTCA.31 Furthermore, the disclosure statement may not 
contain information other than that required by the FTC Rule or 
any state law which is not preempted by the FTC Rule. 32 The in­
fOnllation must be current as of the completion of the franchisor's 
most recent fiscal year. Revisions must be made on a quarterly ba­
sis if there has been any material change relating to the franchising 
business or the franchisor. 
C. Earnings Claims 
Representations of earnings, actual or potential sales and in­
come or profits of existing or potential franchised operations are 
forbidden unless:33 there is a reasonable basis for such representa­
tions; the representations are prepared in accordance with gener­
ally accepted accounting principles; the franchisor has evidence to 
substantiate the representations and the evidence is available to a 
prospective franchisee and the FTC upon reasonable demand; and . 
the representations are geographically relevant. An earnings state­
ment must be furnished on a required form and within the same 
time constraints as the primary. disclosure statement. In addition to 
accurate representation of financial information and the bases 
therefor, there must be cautionary language of a specific form ad­
vising the prospective franchisee of the importance of the docu­
ment and of the fact that the representations are merely esti­
mates. 34 
31. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 1972). See also note 3 supra. 
32. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(21) (1979). 
33. Id. at § 436.1(b), (c) (1979). 
34. "CAUTION. These figures are only estimates of what we think you may 
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Representations of earnings constitute the essence of the op­
portunity offered since the prospective franchisee bases his or her 
investment decision on such financial data. By carefully restricting 
the kind and source of such data and by requiring the availability 
of substantiation instead of actual substantiation, the FTC has not 
made compliance unduly burdensome for prospective franchisors or 
offerors. 
D. Conduct Which Violates the Rule 
The abuses in franchising and franchise sales have been widely 
recognized. These include antitrust violations, unfair and deceptive 
acts, breaches of contract and others. Failure to comply with the 
FTC Rule results not only in violation of the FTCA but as shown 
later, of the "Little FTC Acts"35 adopted in certain states. In addi­
tion to a failure to disclose material information required by the 
FTC Rule, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the 
meaning of section 5 of the FTCA for any franchisor or franchise 
broker: to make representations about the actual or potential sales, 
income, or profits of existing or prospective franchises except in 
the manner set forth in the FTC Rule;36 to make any claim or rep­
resentation, such as in advertising or oral statements by salesper­
sons, which is inconsistent with the information required to be dis­
closed by the FTC Rule;37 to fail to furnish prospective franchisees, 
earn; there is no assurance you'll do as well. If you rely 'upon our figures you must 
accept the risk of not doing as well." Id. § 436.1(b)(4). 
35. "Little or baby FTC Acts" are so named because they are state statutes 
which, in substance, forbid the same conduct as does Federal Trade Commission Act 
§ 5. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in commerce are prohibited. Although consumer protection statutes 
have been enacted in practically all fifty states, the "little FTC Acts", such as ch. 
93A, are so named because they contain the nearly identical substantive statutory 
prohibition and because they are to be construed harmoniously with the federal pre­
cedent which has developed under the FTCA since its inception. Similar statutes 
are: ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-110a to 
42-110c (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.201-.213 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); HAW. 
REV. STAT. §§ 480-1 to 480-24 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%, §§ 261-272 (Smith­
Hurd Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:1401-1:1418 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 206-214 (West 1964); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14 to 
101-142 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to 29 (1975); S.C. CODE §§ 39-5 to 10-160 
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451-2462 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN: §§ 
19.86.010-.920 (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.18-.38 (West 1973). For information on 
state legislation to combat unfair trade practices, contact the Office of Public Infor­
mation or Counsel for Federal-State Co-Operation, Federal Trade Commission, 
Washington, D.C. 20580. 
36. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(b)-(e) (1979). 
37. Id. § 436.1(f). 
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within the time frames established by the FTC Rule, with copies of 
the franchisor's standard form franchise agreement and copies of 
related agreements to be signed by the parties;38 and to fail to re­
turn to prospective franchisees any funds or deposits, such as down 
payments, identified as refundable in the disclosure document. 39 
In addition, numerous examples of conduct prohibited by the 
FTC Rule and statute are set forth in the important accompanying 
statement of basis and purpose. These include misrepresentations 
of material facts regarding earnings, training, quality and quantity 
of supply, important contractual restrictions and the like. They also 
include failure to disclose important information and bad faith 
breaches of contract. Examples of prohibited conduct will be re­
viewed below. These represent the current judgment of the FIC 
as to conduct which appears unfair or deceptive from the busi­
nessperson's perspective. 
The FIC's interpretation of unfair and deceptive commercial 
conduct is quite persuasive in Massachusetts. 4o Furthermore, a re­
view of· Massachusetts authorities discloses that only a few cases 
involving the businessperson's cause of action have been decided 
by the state's appellate courtS.41 The FTC Rule is, therefore, a 
spotlight to assist in evaluating unfairness and deception in the 
commercial arena. The FTC's analyses of various categories of com­
mercial conduct involving the relatively unsophisticated consumer 
entrepreneur are discussed below in an attempt to isolate basic ele­
ments or factors which may be pertinent in other commercial situa­
tions. Moreover, although franchising is the particular commercial 
sector under FTC analysis, these valuable interpretations are appli­
cable to situations involving other business opportunity offerings 
and perhaps to the many other commercial relations to which chap­
ter 93A is applicable. 42 
E. State Franchise Laws-Preemption 
The FIC Rule is intended to function as a minimum disclo­
sure standard in franchising43 and as a supplement to existing state 
38. ld. § 436.1(g). 
39. ld. § 436.1(h). 
40. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (West 1972); see text accompanying 
notes 54-64 infra. 
41. See, e.g., Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 360 N.E.2d 870 (1977). 
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A § l(b) (West 1972). See text accompanying 
not~s 133-152 infra. 
43. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,719-22 (1978). 
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statutes and regulations. States may regulate as they see fit to pro­
vide additional protection. The FTC Rule, however, has the force 
and effect of federal law. It preempts state and local laws to the ex­
tent that they conflict.44 Examples of state laws which would not 
be preempted are registration requirements for franchisors and 
franchise brokers, for escrow and bonding arrangements and for 
disclosure in excess of that required by the FTC Rule. 45 Finally, 
the FTC Rule does not preempt state laws which regulate the con­
duct of the business (franchise) relationship such as may be in­
volved in termination and renewal practices, other contract terms 
and financing arrangements. 
F. Current Status of the FTC Rule 
The FTC Rule and statement of basis and purpose were pro­
mulgated by the Commission on December 21, 1978. The original 
effective date of July 21 was postponed three months to October 
21, 1979. The extension was needed to complete the guidelines to 
be used by those attempting to comply with the FTC Rule. 46 Fur­
thermore, some of the nation's major oil companies and other large 
franchisors are challenging the FTC Rule as unsupported by the 
evidence and on due process grounds. The proceedings47 are now 
44. For a collection of state statutes which regulate franchising see STATE 
BUSINESS FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE AND RELATIONSHIP LAWS, AS OF JUNE 1, 1978 
(CCH) (1978). For a current compilation of such laws, see FRANCHISE LAWS REGS. & 
RULES (INT'L FRANCHISE Assoc.). 
45. Examples of state franchise statutes which require registration before busi­
ness may be done in the state are: CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31110-31111 (West 1977); 
1979 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 79-458 (effective date July 1, 1979); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 
19-28-5 (Supp. 1978). 
46. On July 26, 1979, the FTC adopted final guidelines to assist franchisors in 
understanding and complying with the FTC Rule. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966 (1979). The 
guidelines present the FTC's interpretation of the FTC Rule and factors franchisors 
should consider in determining (a) which relationships are covered; (b) who is to re­
ceive disclosures; (c) when disclosures must be made; and (d) how disclosure docu­
ments may be used. Id. The guidelines describe and explain the informational re­
quirements for each of the twenty categories of the disclosure statement as well as 
provide valuable assistance on the use of earnings claims. Id. For a critical analysis 
of the guidelines, see [1979] 7 CURRENT LEGAL DIGEST (published by the Interna­
tional Franchise Association, Washington, D.C.). See also 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (1979). 
47. In re FTC Franchise Rule Review, No. 78-3680 (9th Cir., Consol. May 18, 
1979): See also 895 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-12 (Jan. 4, 1979); 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 367, at 3 (Jan. 8, 1979); id. No. 368, at 12 (Jan. 17, 
1979); id. No. 407, at 1 (Oct. 19, 1979). The issue before the Ninth Circuit is whether 
the Rule was promulgated constitutionally and pursuant to proper statutory authority. 
The FTC asserts that it had the power to promulgate the rule pursuant to the FTCA 
§ 6(g), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1976). In support, it says that in 1975 rulemaking proce­
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consolidated before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. In their application to the United States Supreme 
Court in which a stay of the FTC Rule's effective date was re­
quested, they contended that such an affirmative rule must be 
based on facts which exist today in the petroleum industry and not 
simply on the 1971 to 1974 facts as they existed in the fast food in­
dustry. Justice Rehnquist denied the request for a stay on October 
16, 1979. Notwithstanding any final decision concerning the effect­
iveness of the FTC Rule itself, the decision has no effect on the 
statement of basis and purpose48 which is not subject to judicial 
review. 
IV. IMPACT OF THE FTC RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
A. The Value of the FTC Rule as Precedent Under Chapter 93A 
The legislature has expressly directed that Massachusetts 
courts "will" be guided by interpretations given by the FTC and 
dures for the FTC were codified by statute in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC 
Improvement Act § 202(a), 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1976). The FTC further contends, how­
ever, that the rule is not a Magnuson-Moss rule in the sense that it need not have 
followed that Act's statutory rulemaking procedures. According to the FTC, the Rule 
was issued under the Act's "grandfather" clause which expressly permitted issuance 
of rules in pre-Magnuson-Moss rulemaking proceedings that had been substantially 
completed at the time of enactment of the Act. 16 C.F.R. § 202(c)(I) (1979). The pub­
lic record for the FTC Rule was closed by the FTC on November 20, 1974. A pre­
sentation of data, views and arguments was substantially completed prior to the date 
of enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act on January 4, 1975. The FTC Rule 
was therefore duly promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614,59,637 n.109 (1978). 
Those challenging the Rule urged that new rulemaking proceedings should have 
been held between 1975 and 1979 because of changed circumstances in franchis­
ing generally and in certain industries (e.g. oil) in particular. Apparently Justice 
Rehnquist did not feel that this argument was substantial enough to warrant a stay of 
the effective date of the Rule. The application was denied on October 16, 1979. 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 407, at 1 (Oct. 19, 1979). For a detailed compilation of 
the arguments presented to the Ninth Circuit by petitioners and the Commission, see 
[1980] 2 CURRENT LEGAL DIGEST (INT'L FRANCHISE Assoc.). 
Many large oil and automobile corporations which have challenged the rule in 
the aforementioned proceedings have been informed that they are exempt from its 
application or that they do not use distribution systems that fall within the FTC's 
franchise definition. Some are exempt (e.g. auto factories) because they involve bona 
fide purchases of goods at wholesale by retailers for resale. Others are exempt be­
cause they did not require their franchisees to make the required payment of $500 or 
more within the first six months of operation. For additional information on exemp­
tions and exclusions, see 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)(3), (4) (1979). 
48. The statement of basis and purpose is not subject to judicial review by a 
federal appeals court. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(5)(C) (1976). Katharine Gibbs School, Inc. v. 
FTC, 944 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-l, 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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the federal courts to section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA.49 The Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court has expressly sustained this ap­
proach. 50 Likewise, the legislature has empowered the Attorney 
General to promulgate regulations which are not to be inconsistent 
with the interpretations given by the FTC and federal courts to 
section 5. 51 Since 1967, many such regulations of general and spe­
cific commercial applicability have been promulgated. None of 
these has been stricken and some have been expressly approved52 
by the state's appellate courts. Thus, there is ample reason to be­
lieve that the FTC interpretations represent persuasive precedent. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has consulted FTC ad­
visory opinions53 published in the Federal Register for guidance in 
construing and applying chapter 93A. Published opinion letters of 
FTC staff members may also be considered. Although the statute 
does not expressly require that FTC interpretations be followed, 
no express rejection of these interpretations by a Massachusetts court 
has arisen. 
The FTC Rule contains many FTC interpretations of section 5 
of the FTCA. These are interpretations of the identical federal stat­
utory prohibition against unfair or deceptive conduct as applied to 
franchising. In the statement of basis and purpose, many different 
categories of conduct are evaluated, including misrepresentations, 
failures to disclose important facts, bad faith contractual breaches 
and other types of unscrupulous or oppressive business practices. 
Because generalities cannot sufficiently communicate the unfairness 
referred to, consider the following examples: 
(1) 	 A New Jersey man invested $7,500 in a franchise, 
gave up his job and moved his family to Florida 
based on representations made by a protection de­
vice franchisor that he would receive training assist­
ance and adequate supply of product. He did not and 
lost his investment. 54 
49. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (West 1972). 
50. PMP As!,ocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915 
(1975). "[W)e must look to these interpretations to determine whether the defend­
ant's refusal to accept plaintiff's advertising constitutes an unfair trade practice." Id. 
at 595, 321 N.E.2d at 917; see Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 1065 (1978). 
51. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (West 1972). See note 15 supra. 
52. See notes 17 & 18 supra. See also Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General 
Motors Corp., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2091, 393 N.E.2d 376 (1979). 
53. PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 598-99, 321 
N.E.2d 915, 919 (1975). 
54. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,625 (1978). 
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(2) 	 Franchisors represented that they had strong con­
nections with famous sports and entertainment per­
sonalities when such was not the case. 55 
(3) 	 A franchisor represented and agreed with prospective 
franchisees that part or all of their initial investment 
would be refunded if they decided they did not want 
the franchised store within the first six months. The 
franchisor refused to honor the promise. 56 
(4) 	 A franchisor of parts for all fork-lift trucks persuaded 
his twenty or more franchisees to purchase $500,000 
worth of special parts for a program to supply one of 
the largest domestic airlines. The airline deal never 
materialized; the franchisees were stuck with all the 
unusable merchandise. 57 
(5) 	 A convertible sofa bed manufacturer simply informed 
its distributors that, due to excess shipping expenses, 
it would no longer make good for defects in work­
manship or materials leaving its franchisees to bear 
the costs thereafter. 58 
(6) 	 A new gasoline station dealer was required to pay 
$5,000 for tires, batteries, and accessories on hand, 
including a quantity of obsolete fan belts-some for 
cars not made in twenty years. 59 
The interpretations in the FTC Rule regarding situations like those 
described above stand as persuasive authority to which Massa­
chusetts courts must look for guidance when confronted with issues 
arising under chapter 93A. The FTC Rule should be equally per­
suasive in the other states which have enacted "Little FTC Acts." 
A uniformity aid, the FTC Rule stands as a virtual treasure chest of 
FTCA section 5 interpretations of unfairness and deception. 
Chapter 93A's elusive "unfairness" and "deception" standards 
require guidance from the FTC and federal court interpretations. 
The FTC has expertise in the regulation of trade and commerce; 
state courts lack such skills and experience. FTC critics claim that, 
in general, the FTC has fashioned prospective relief rather than 
penalties or compensation for past conduct which violates the stat­
ute. This is a poor justification for discounting the value of such in­
55. [d. at 59,630. 
56. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,632-33 (1978). 
57. 	 H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALTIES AND REMEDIES 38 (2d ed. 1978). 
58. [d. 
59. Id. 
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terpretations. Since the FTC has continually evaluated unfairness 
and deception in commerce for years, its interpretations of substan­
tive law in that area have valuable significance. Its views, there­
fore, merit great weight in the quest for understanding substantive 
law under chapter 93A. Perhaps less weight should be given by 
Massachusetts courts to FTC remedial approaches when fashioning 
relief under chapter 93A. Nevertheless, the differing statutory re­
medial approaches, albeit significant, have little to do with applica­
tions of the practically identical substantive statutory prohibitions. 
Therefore, unless clearly erroneous or unless there is a split60 
among federal circuit courts of appeals as to the soundness of an 
FTC interpretation, such interpretations are likely to be followed 
in Massachusetts and in those states which have "Little FTC Acts." 
Commercial need for nationwide uniformity gives increased sup­
port to according FTC interpretations great weight in the area of 
trade regulation. 
The FTC's interpretation as to conduct which is unfair or de­
ceptive need not be only prospectively applied because the inter­
pretations constitute construction of a statute enacted in 1938.61 In 
years past, commercial operators were supposed to comply with 
these statutory prohibitions. Since 1938, the FTC, the federal 
courts, Congress, state legislatures and state courts have all taken 
part in advancing the interests of the consumer.62 With regard to 
deception, the decisions encompass a broad spectrum of illegal 
practices. These deceptive practices include: Failing to disclose 
kickbacks in connection with the sale of franchises; misrepresenting 
the nature of services for franchisees;63 and misrepresenting the 
60. FTC v. Texaco Oil Corp., 393 U.S. 223 (1968). 
61. As originally enacted in 1914, § 5 of the FTCA authorized the FTC to pro­
scribe only unfair methods of competition. Act of September 15, 1914, ch. 311, § 5(a), 
38 Stat. 719. The early FTC cases contained rulings to the effect that this language 
required a showing that a challenged practice injured or tended to injure present or 
potential competitors, and that consumer exploitation or deception alone was not suf­
ficient to establish a violation. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); FTC 
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). In 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Amendment added 
the prohibition against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to the text of § 5. Act 
of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. Ill. This conferred on the FTC the ability to 
center its attention on protection of consumers from such acts or practices without re­
gard to potential anticompetitive effects. See generally ANTl-TRUsrLAW DEVELOP­
MENTS 165-228 (1975) (published by the ABA). " 
62. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation ofAdver­
tising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977). 
63. In re Barton's Candy Inc., 79 F.T.C. 101, 106 (1971). This case also in­
cluded deceptive claims of surveys and electronic site analysis. 
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operational methods to be used by franchisees as well as the ex­
pectable potential earnings from a franchise. 64 In addition, there is 
an established body of law under section 5 of the flCA 
proscribing anticompetitive conduct, such as confinement of sales 
to specified territories, vertical and horizontal price fixing,65 and 
tying violations. 66 As a result, commercial operators will be unable 
to argue convincingly solely for prospective application because of 
their reliance on established commercial conduct later found to 
have violated the statute. 
This is also true with respect to "unfairness." Admittedly, 
there is less federal precedent in this category. It was not until 
1972 that the United States Supreme Court confirmed that conduct 
may be unlawful as an unfair act or practice without in any way be­
ing deceptive or anticompetitive. 67 Since then, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court has construed the term "unfair" in a vari­
ety of circumstances. For example, in Commonwealth v. DeCotis,68 
it affirmed a judgment that it was unfair for a mobile home park 
operator to exact by contract a charge from mobile home owners 
for the transfer of a licensed space in the park when no meaningful 
service was performed in exchange. Embracing the strong public 
policy underlying the statute and applying its prohibitions broadly, 
the court rejected the defendant's argument that such charges were 
uniformly collected by mobile home park operators in the Com­
monwealth. The existence of an industry-wide practice did not con­
stitute a defense for unlawful conduct. 69 Such a reliance interest 
may possibly prevail if the practice conformed and complied with 
an established commercial custom in the community as understood 
at common law. 70 Nevertheless, the FTC Rule was designed to re­
64. Chicken Unltd. Inc. v. Bockover, 873 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) D-1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 374 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1979) (regarding profitability representations under Florida's "little F.T.C. 
Act"). 
65. Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 1105 (1975); In re Chock Full of Nuts Corp. Inc., 83 F.T.C. 575 (1973); 43 Fed. 
Reg. 59,719 (1978). 
66. FTC V. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); In re Howard Johnson Co., 
[1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,577, at 21,685 (F.T.C. 
1979) (other than 23 unique products, the franchisor was banned from requiring fran­
chisees to buy some 170 products from the franchisor and was ordered to license oth­
ers to manufacture same under specifications). 
67. FTC V. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). 
68. 366 Mass. 234,316 N.E.2d 748 (1974). 
69. Id. at 240-21, 316 N.E.2d at 748. 
70. Compare Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. V. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 
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quire disclosure of information which should have been volun­
teered in the past, but was not. Through chapter 93A, the FTC 
Rule must be rendered effective to combat the pervasive deception 
which has crippled franchising in the past. 
B. 	 The Effect of the FTC Rule on Unfairness and 
Deception Analysis 
The FTC Rule is intended to benefit unsophisticated con­
sumer entrepreneurs-those who may be easily exploited because 
they lack sufficient information to make a well-informed investment 
decision. Although the federal cases have indicated that section 5 
of the FTCA was primarily intended to protect the unthinking, ig­
norant and naive,71 these consumer entrepreneurs are also in­
cluded among those for whom new substantive commercial rights 
were created under chapter 93A. The purpose here is to examine 
exemplary categori~s of commercial conduct discussed in the FTC 
Rule in order to elucidate factors which may indicate other com­
mercial conduct which is deceptive or unfair. Comparison with 
Massachusetts decisions and those of other states will be made 
when appropriate. 
In certain commercial transactions, there must be dissemina­
tion of material information to protect the commercial operator and 
to provide the consumer entrepreneur with basic data needed to 
make a rational investment decision. This simply means that the 
commercial operator must affirmatively disclose all important facts 
and act in good faith with due diligence. One way to do this is to 
view the transaction from the customer's position and to determine 
what information would be needed to make a proper decision un­
der the circumstances. 
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945) with T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d CiT. 
1932). In general, the existence of a custom may be established and incorporated 
into agreements by implication with regard to subject matter about which known us­
ages prevail. Such usages or customs must be established as accepted common prac­
tice by a group in the community, must be relied on by the group for the effective 
continuance of commercial transactions and must be viewed as obligatory by those 
within the group. Furthermore, it must be an old or well established practice. In 
Dixon, the court incorporated into the provisions of a letter of credit agreement the 
uniform custom among New York banks, exporters and importers to the effect that, in 
lieu of a missing bill or bills of lading presented under credits calling for a full set of 
bills of lading, the bank issuing the credits would accept a guaranty of a leading 
New York bank. Compare In re General Motors Corp., 934 ANTITRUST & TRADE 
REG. REP. A-13-14 (1979). 
71. 	 Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). 
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1. Misrepresentation in the Franchise Offering 
The FTC found that many franchisors made' deceptive repre­
sentations concerning material facts about their franchise offerings. 
These72 include false or misleading statements about: the quality 
or quantity of supplies, equipment or services to be provided; the 
timing in which products or services would be provided; the value 
of advertising to be provided; the value and profitability of the 
franchise offered; the franchisor's background, financial condition 
and relationships with affiliates and public figures; and exclusive 
territorial protection to be afforded franchisees. The complaints 
raised in public hearings73 before the FTC demonstrated the eco­
nomic harm caused by franchisees' reliance on franchisors' repre­
sentations concerning the matters set forth above. To the extent 
any such representation is false or misleading, it is deceptive under 
section 5 of the FTCA if the party to whom the representation was 
made would have justifiably not consummated a business transac­
tion had the truth been known. Such conduct also violates chapter 
93A.74 It need only be shown that the material representation had 
the capacity or tendency to deceive. 75 
Profitability representations are most significant to offerees of 
business opportunities. 76 False or misleading statements as to value 
72. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,628-31 (1978). See 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3.03 (1978) (regard­
ing deceptive advertising of guarantees). 
73. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,622, 59,628-31 (1978). These public hearings occurred in 
1972. 
74. See, e.g., Stolarcyk v. Doug Russell, Inc., No. lO13 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977). 
A dealer misrepresented that a boat was "a demo" when in fact it had been owned 
by a third party and had been damaged. This was held to violate ch. 93A and multi­
ple damages plus attorneys' fees were awarded. Id. 
75. There is no need to show fraudulent conduct or intent to deceive under 
FTCA § 5, nor is it necessary to show that the act or practice actually deceived a 
party. "Innocence of motive" does not relieve a party of his duties to comply. FTC v. 
Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934) (Cardozo, J.). It is only necessary to show 
that the practice has the capacity to deceive. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. 
FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); accord, 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3.05 (1978). "No 
claim or representation shall be made by any means concerning a product which di­
rectly, or by implication, or by failure to disclose additional relevant information has 
the capacity or tendency or effect of deceiving buyers or prospective buyers in any 
material respect." Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass: 688, 704, 322 N.E.2d 
768, 778 (1975) (quoting Section IV(A) of the rules and regulations of the Attorney 
General). See also McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagon, No. 77-752-S, at 3 (D. Mass., 
Nov. 7, 1979). 
76. The public record is replete with spurious representations as to profitability 
in franchising. Consider the following examples of exaggerated earnings projections. 
A cosmetics franchisor, which itself reported only a $3,000 profit during the relevant 
fiscal period, was projecting a typical annual profit of between $20,000 and $86,000 
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or moneymaking capacity are material and, therefore, unfair and 
deceptive if unsubstantiated or made without a reasonable basis. 77 
False or misleading statements about a party's background, fi­
nancial condition, current operating status and relationships with 
affiliates or public figures are "deceptive" as they directly affect the 
value of a business offering. Clearly, it would be deceptive to rep­
resent that an entity is financially stable when the opposite is true. 
Similarly, a representation of affiliation78 with a famous personality 
could be irrelevant as to the actual merits of a specific offering, 
perhaps with an inherently misleading implication as to the verac­
ity of the claim. It may be of crucial significance to the offeree that 
certain individuals actively manage or control the venture for 
which his investment was solicited. There is no doubt that eco­
nomic harm can and has resulted from reliance on false or mislead­
ing statements regarding executive management and administrative 
capabilities. There is a duty to disclose material facts concerning 
management. Therefore, both misrepresentation and failure to 
disclose such facts are deceptive and unfair. 
Of like significance are representations or promises that a 
party will be granted an exclusive right, such as the right to oper­
ate in a defined territory free from intrabrand competition. 79 Be­
cause exclusive territories are desirable to franchisees, they often 
operate as a selling tool for franchisors. Often, in good faith, the 
franchisee makes an all-out sales effort to develop the market in his 
territory. He or she should not be deprived of the good will cre­
ated because of intrabrand competition by another franchisee or 
company store if representations or promises were made to the 
contrary. If in fact there is no exclusive right, the offering is of sub­
stantially lesser value without such protection, and an unfair and 
deceptive act has occurred. 
for buyers of its franchises. A fabric repair franchising company projected that fran­
chisees would realize returns ranging from 138 percent to 298 percent on a $15,500 
investment, yet it failed to disclose that it recently suffered a loss in its own similar 
company operation and that during the last fiscal year three of its franchisees went 
out of business. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,629-31 (1978). See generally H. BROWN, supra note 
57 at 32-51 & 119-156. . 
77. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,632 (1978). In addition to "little FTC Acts," some states 
have enacted statutes regulating franchise or business offerings in particular. See, 
e.g., FLA STAT. § 817.416 (1976), which forbids the intentional misrepresentation of a 
business offering's chances for success. See also 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3-01(17) (1978) 
(the word "product" is defined to include "franchise."). 
78. Such a misrepresentation violates the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). See 
also 43 Fed. Reg. 59,630, 59,677 (1978). 
79. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,630-31 (1978). 
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By comparison, to prosecute a claim for common law misrep­
resentation, the victim must show express misstatement, planned 
reliance and damage resulting directly from the conduct. 80 In 
Massachusetts, however, recovery in a deceit action also may be 
obtained if a false statement was made as of a party's own knowl­
edge. The statement cannot be merely a matter of opinion, esti­
mate, or judgment; it must be susceptible of knowledge. It is then 
unnecessary to prove actual intent to deceive. 81 
The FTC Rule's test for deception is merely whether the rep­
resentation "has a tendency to deceive the consumer82 in any par­
ticular which could reasonably influence the latter's buying 
choice."83 Similarly, under the regulation promulgated by the 
Massachusetts Attorney General, the standard is whether the claim 
or representation has the capacity to, or effect of, deceiving buyers 
or prospective buyers. 84 To realize the objective of protecting con­
sumers and less sophisticated businesspersons from exploitation 
by those with more information and experience, actual deception 
need not be shown. 85 The sophisticated marketing specialist must 
now satisfy the new legal policies of good faith, due diligence, and 
honesty. 
2. Unsubstantiated or Atypical Profitability Claims 
The potential buyer of a business is crucially concerned with 
potential sales, income, profits or take-home pay from the pro­
posed venture. Profit projections are particularly susceptible to in­
accuracy even when made in good faith. 86 The abuse which has 
been rampant in franchising may not differ significantly from that 
in other segments of the economy. Offerors have often made 
glowing earnings projections regarding a particular venture: when 
they did not know the true past profits of similar ventures already 
80. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525. 
81. Powell v. Rasmussen, 355 Mass. 117, 243 N.E.2d 167 (1969); Yorke v. 
Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1954); Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffat, 147 
Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168, 169 (1888). 
82. Note that in the context of the FTC Rule, the term "consumer" refers to 
prospective franchisee or business opportunity offeree. Regarding ch. 93A, such a 
party would bring suit under § 11 as a businessperson rather than under § 9 as a con­
sumer. 
83. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,631 nn. 58 & 59 (1978) (citing FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 
291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934)) (additional citations omitted). 
84. See note 75 supra. 
85. See notes 75 & 83 supra. 
86. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra. 
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sold;87 when in fact there were no such similar ventures or were 
very few of them;88 or when the venture used as an example of po­
tential profitability had in fact experienced atypical earnings as 
compared with a similar venture offered or the majority of other 
similar ventures offered in the past. 89 
If statements or projections are not typically representative for 
the particular business and location or not adequately substantiated 
when disseminated, they would be both "unfair and deceptive" un­
der section 5 of the FTCA90 and section 2 of chapter 93A.91 
The FTC Rule requires that profitability computations and 
representations be made in accordance with generally accepted ac­
counting principles and that they be geographically typical. Though 
data need not be furnished initially, the bases for the representa­
tions or calculations must be made available on demand both to the 
FTC and to the offeree. Offering data can be based either on thor­
ough market testing or on a proven track record, provided that 
there is honest and pointed disclosure of the sources. Even so, the 
offeror must give to the offeree the warning contained in the spe­
cific disclaimer language prescribed by the FTC. 
The crucial factor lies in the information imbalance existing 
between buyers: and sellers of business opportunities and the ease 
of buyer exploitation. To further the promotion of informed busi­
87. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,631 n.64 (1978). 
88. Id. at 59,632 n.65. 
89. Id. at 59,632 nn.66 & 67. Chicken Unltd. Inc. v. Bockover, 873 ANTITRUST 
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 374 So. 
2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (regarding profitability representations under 
Florida's "little FTC Act"). 
90. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,632 (1978). 
91. The FTC Rule is to be contrasted with the format used by some states 
where franchise registration laws require franchisors to register material information 
with state agencies and to give this information to franchisees in the form of a writ­
ten prospectus. The composite of these state law requirements has been assembled 
in the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (U.F.O.C.), devised by the Midwest Se­
curities Commissioners Association in cooperation with industry representatives. The 
U.F.O.C., para. 19.c.(4) and (5), forbids the making of profitability representations 
unless based on audited financial statements of existing franchisees. New franchisors 
would be confronted with a serious barrier to entry since they could not possess 
such financial reports. Because of that anticompetitive barrier, all but two states have 
waived this requirement. In many other respects, the U.F.O.C. is superior to the 
FTC Rule because it requires more detailed disclosure as well as public filing and 
approval of the state regulatory agency before a francis or can begin doing business in 
the state. See H. BROWN, supra note 57, at 165, 177-78 & 398-428 for a cogent expla­
nation of state franchise regulation and in particular the differences and similarities 
between the FTC Rule and various state rules requiring disclosure as outlined in the 
U.F.O.C. 
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ness decisionmaking and simply as a matter of marketplace fairness 
and economic sense, a consumer-entrepreneur is entitled to rely 
upon an offeror to represent truthfully and have a reasonable basis 
for making performance claims. 92 It is neither unduly costly nor 
burdensome for offerors to shoulder this responsibility as compared 
with the economic losses which may be incurred by the victims of 
unsupported claims. 
3. Failure to Honor Refund or Payment Representations 
Not only in franchising, but throughout commerce, the failure 
to keep a refund promise is a material misrepresentation regarding 
investment risk. Failure to make a refund, as and when promised, 
can cause devastating injury particularly if the deposit is substan­
tial. In real estate transactions, builders, sellers and brokers often 
contract to refund deposits if substantial performance does not take 
place within a prescribed period. This may be followed by either 
failure to perform or failure to refund the deposit with complete or 
reckless disregard for the consequences. Under the FTC Rule,93 in 
the franchise context, a failure to refund a deposit as agreed vio­
lates section 5 of the FTCA. The same standard should apply fair­
ly to a variety of other offerings of business and real estate oppor­
tunities. 
Under section 2 of chapter 93A, this interpretation of the 
FTCA must be used as a guide for enforcement. Although the fa­
92. In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972). 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3: 11(2) 
(1978) states that: "It is an unfair and deceptive trade practice to make any represen­
tations as to opportunities ... or to promote any activity, occupation, or vocation as 
being profitable for one engaging in it if in fact the representations as to the opportu­
nities available or profits to be made are untrue." 
93. The FTC Rule refund policy was forcefully expounded by the FTC in its 
statement of basis and purpose where it stated: 
[AJ representation which has a substantial tendency or capacity to deceive 
persons in their purchasing decisions is unlawful under section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act. A representation that a deposit or fee will 
be refunded, when subsequently not honored, is deceptive because it mis­
represents the actual financial risk of the transaction. The practice of failing 
to honor contractual refund provisions is also unfair under section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (under the criteria for "unfairness" set out 
by the Commission in the "cigarette rule" proceeding) because it violates 
the fundamental public policy favoring the fulfillment of contract obligations 
and it results in substantial injury to promisees. Commission cases have long 
recognized that the failure to return deposits on the purchase price in a con­
sumer transaction, contrary to representations made, is an unfair and decep­
tive act or practice in violation of the Fede.ral Trade Commission Act. 
43 Fed. Reg. 59,633 (1978). See also 29 Fed. Reg. 8,324, 8,355 (1978) (regarding the 
"cigarette rule" proceeding). 
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miliar violations of the statute are tortious in nature, the failure to 
refund may be viewed as a derivative of contract law. 94 The "un­
fairness" can be found in the serious impact on the buyer when a 
substantial deposit is involved coupled with the representational 
character of the unequivocal promise to refund promptly in the ab­
sence of substantial compliance. The inequity is similar to the 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when 
one party to a contract unjustifiably deprives the other of the fruits 
of the contract. 95 A knowing violation of this covenant with reckless 
disregard for the consequences should be viewed as an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice under chapter 93A.96 
4. Failure to Disclose Material Facts 
The FTC Rule is of acute assistance in the area of disclosure 
because it sheds light on the dichotomy between "unfairness" anal­
ysis and "deception" analysis. It discusses and applies the unfair­
ness criteria97 approved by both the United States Supreme Court 
94. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., [1979] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 
~ 62,869, at 79,019 (7th Cir. 1979); Fortune v. National Cash Register, 77 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1569,364 N.E.2d 125 (1977); Drucker v. Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 76 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1408, 348 N.E.2d 763 (1976); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 
N.E.2d 768 (1975); Commonwealth v. Decotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 
(1974); Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 335, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). 
95. See note 94 supra. See also H. BROWN, supra note 57 at 240-72. 
96. Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 335, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). 
The Massachusetts Attorney General has promulgated regulations concerning refund 
representations. 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, §§ 3.01 to .05 (1979). A refund is covered by regu­
lations concerning deceptive warranties or guarantees. Id. § 3.03. The regulations de­
fine a warranty as any statement in the nature of an express warranty or guarantee 
which includes any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the product offered and "becomes part of the basis of the bargain." 
Id. § 3.01(24). See general regulations designed to protect c~nsumer purchasers 
where "warranty/guarantee" is defined. Id. § 3.01(24). See also 16 C.F.R. § 
436.1(b)-(e) (1979). "'Satisfaction or your money back' ... or similar representa­
tions will be construed as a guarantee that the full purchase price will be refunded 
at the option of the buyer." 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3.02(3) (1979). Paragraph II.F. pro­
vides that: "A seller ... shall not ... represent that a product is guaranteed when he 
cannot or does not promptly and scrupulously fulfill his obligations under the guar­
antee." Id. § 3.02(6). "A specific example of refusal to perform obligations under the 
guarantee is use of satisfaction or your money back' when the guarantor cannot or 
does not intend promptly to make full refund upon request." Id. 
Although these regulations were promulgated for consumers' benefit, they may 
be invoked by businesspersons under § 11. Public Works Supply Co. v. Stewart & 
Prince, Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 870 (1977). This decision, coupled with the 
FTC's position regarding failure to honor refund pRJJlIises made to franchisees, pro­
vides substantial support for § 11 plaintiffs who wish to in\'.()ke ch. 93A action against 
those who wrongfully disregard such refund promises. 
97. See note 109 infra. See also text accompanying notes 107-130 infra. 
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and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The fact patterns 
on which the FTC interpretations are based are common enough 
for such interpretations to be generally applicable to many com­
mercial transactions even though expressly presented within the 
context of franchise or business venture offerings. Furthermore, re­
cent Massachusetts decisions98 independently embrace these FTC 
teachings. 
a. Material Matters for Disclosure 
In many business transactions, an offeror thinks he is acting 
lawfully when he fails to disclose something of importance so long 
as he does not expressly make a misrepresenation. This is not so. 
Under the FTC Rule, the doctrine of caveat emptor no longer 
applies. Simple silence may be unfair, deceptive or both if there is 
a nondisclosure of a fact which is material to an informed assess­
ment of the risks and benefits of an offering. Because of the infor­
mational imbalance often found to exist between the offeror and 
offeree and the ease of exploiting offerees, there is an affirmative 
duty to disclose in good faith matters which the offeror knows or 
has reason to know would be material. 99 
Price. In franchise offerings, there has been complaint that 
franchisors failed to disclose initial or recurrent fees which served 
to increase the price of that which was offered. 10o The FTC Rule, 
therefore, requires disclosure of fees to be paid to the offeror, its 
affiliates or third parties in which it has a financial interest, depos­
its on rent or equipment, and other payment obligations which 
must be satisfied to make a venture operative following a signifi­
cant investment. This also applies to recurring fees such as royal­
ties, rent, service charges, advertising contributions and the like. It 
would apply if the offeree was required to purchase supplies from 
the offeror or a third party at such high prices that operating the 
venture would prove unprofitable. If the price of the opportunity is 
98. Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Killeen, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 384 N.E.2d 1231 
(1979); Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850,382 N.E.2d 1065 
(1978). 
99. Even if liability is shown, substantial proof of good faith disclosure may cer­
tainly aid in one's avoiding double or treble damage liability under MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1972). Section 11 provides that the court may, in its dis­
cretion, award such damages if the guilty party acted willfully or knowingly. Id. § 11 
(West Cum. Supp. 1979). Section 9(3) grants similar relief where a commercial opera­
tor fails to resolve a consumer dispute in bad faith or with reason to know its actions 
violated the statute. Id. § 9(3) (West 1972). 
100. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,633 (1978). 
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significantly affected by undisclosed matters,101 the offeree cannot 
make an informed investment decision. 
The Offeror. Equally important is the data concerning the par­
ties with whom the offeree is dealing. l02 Historical background, fi­
nancial condition, current standing in an industry, affiliations and 
reputation in the community, are all important especially in the 
case where the offeree's viability in an on-going business venture 
may directly depend on the stability and integrity of the offeror. 
The offeror should furnish current and truthful information about 
who it is, what it has done in the past and what it is currently 
doing. The same applies to its officers and key personnel. 
Furthermore, it is material to know the offeror's recent finan­
cial history and its current condition. If the offeror has made simi­
lar opportunities available to others in the past and certain ven­
tures have failed, such failures can be relevant to the offeree's 
decision. loa In franchising, so long as no representations conflict 
with information set forth in the disclosure statement, an offeror 
may explain why factors which may have caused such failures are 
not present in the current offering. l04 
Finally, it would be significant to know of past or pending liti­
gation against the offeror or its key personnel or any bankruptcy or 
other insolvency proceeding in which the offeror was or may be in­
volved. These matters must be disclosed initially because they re­
flect directly on the stability, integrity and reputation of the 
offeror. l05 
Contractual Restrictions. In order to have a meeting of the 
minds with regard to all significant aspects of an arrangement, all 
matters should be presented clearly and simply. In particular, an 
offeree should fully understand what rights he mayor may not 
have with regard to: termination of the relationship with the 
offeror, alienability of property rights which he has bargained for, 
in-term and post-term competition, use of confidential information 
101. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140C (West 1974) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1451-1461 (1976) (Truth-in-Lending Acts) which are nearly identical, embodying a 
comprehensive scheme of consumer credit information disclosure and which, in par­
ticular, set forth various items a credit offeror must disclose to an offeree because 
they constitute part of the price to be paid for a loan. 
102. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,634 (1978). 
103. With regard to franchise offerings, the Rule requires disclosure to prospec­
tive franchisees of the names and addresses of present franchisees most geographic­
ally relevant to the prospective offeree. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(16)(i)-(viii) (1979). 
104. [d. § 436.1(a)(21). 
105. [d. § 436.1(a)(4) & (5). 
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or trade secrets and conditions under which the arrangement may 
be modified. For example, if an on-going supplier-purchaser rela­
tionship is apparent in the venture and the offeror contractually ex­
culpates itself from liability for negligence in the conduct of its 
business, this mayor may not be satisfactory to the offeree. Even if 
it is acceptable, perhaps it should be reflected by a price reduc­
tion. The offeror is often more sophisticated and privy to more rel­
evant information. This is especially true in cases in which the 
offeror prepares the written agreement delineating the rights and 
obligations of the parties. In order to deal fairly and in good faith, 
the offeror should affirmatively disclose106 any contractual restric­
tions which it has reason to believe would be material to the 
offeree. Materiality here means the import which a contractual re­
striction may have on the risk to, or return on, the offeree's invest­
ment. 
b. 	 Failure to Disclose Material Facts as an 

Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice 

Minimally, the foregoing matters should be completely under­
stood by both parties prior to consummation of the transaction. 107 
A simple failure to disclose a material fact may be unfair, deceptive 
or both. 
Unfairness. In the official statement of the basis and purpose, 
the FTC points to three unfairness criteria, emphasizing that a 
practice may be injurious to buyers of business offerings without 
regard to whether that practice is deceptive. These are the same 
criteria to which Massachusetts courts look in determining whether 
an act or practice is unfair, namely: (1) "Whether the practice ... 
is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory or 
other established concept of unfairness; (2) [w]hether it is immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; or (3) [w]hether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other business­
men). "108 These criteria were originally applied by the FTC to 
106. See V.C.C. § 2-316 which in certain instances requires conspicuous war­
ranty disclaimers. Cf, Badaracco v. Donahue Trailer Sales, 7 MASS. LAW WEEKLY 
482-83 (Dist. Ct. of Newton) (1979) (Chernoff, J.) (affirmative duty to disclose 
noncancellation clause on back of trailer sales agreement). See also 20 C.M.R. tit. 
940, § 3.16 (1978). 
107. The FTC Rule requires that a prospective franchisee have at least 10 days 
to review the franchisor's documents, particularly its disclosure statement, before a 
contract is signed or initial payment is made. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(g) (1979). 
108. 	 43 Fed. Reg..59,635 (1978). 
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109smoking advertisements directed toward consumers. In 1972, 
the United States Supreme Court adumbrated the general applica­
tion of these standards for "unfair" conduct110 while confirming 
that the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that of the 
FTC. In 1975, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied 
the same standards when a publisher refused to publish the 
plaintiff's advertisement. 11l The FTC has now reaffirmed their ap­
plication to transactions involving sales of business opportunities to 
small businesspersons. 112 
Unfairness may be evaluated in terms of economic impact on 
consumers or businesspersons. But, in contrast to the competitive 
evaluation mandated by antitrust analysis under the Rule of Rea­
son,113 the unfairness criteria require that other important public 
values be given considerable weight. 114 According to the FTC: "All 
three (of the foregoing) criteria do not need to be satisfied to sup­
port a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of 
the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a 
lesser extent, it meets all three. "115 Therefore, to prove an unfair­
ness claim, it is not always necessary to show that the conduct of 
which the private plaintiff complains "causes substantial injury to 
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)."116 The failure 
109. The unfairness criteria were originally set forth in the FTC's Statement of 
Basis and Purpose for Trade Regulation Rule 408, "Unfair and Deceptive Advertis­
ing and Labelling of Cigarettes in Relation to Health Hazards of Smoking," 29 Fed. 
Reg. 8,324, 8,355 (1964) and apparently approved in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 
405 U.S. 233,244 (1972), and PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 
593, 598-99, 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1975). They are: "1) whether the practice ... is 
within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory or other established 
concept of unfairness; 2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscru­
pulous; or 3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or 
other businessmen)." 43 Fed. Reg. 59,635 (1978). 
110. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). 
111. PMP Assocs. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596, 321 N.E.2d 
915,917 (1975). See also 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(21) (1979). 
112. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,635 (1978). 
113. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
114. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,635 (1978). 
115. [d. (emphasis added). 
116. [d. See note 109 supra. There are cases which have required a showing of 
public impact in private suits brought under "little FTC Acts." See, e.g., Evanston 
Motors Co. v. Mid-S. Toyota Distrib., 436 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (conspiracy 
to supply cars to an area in an anticompetitive fashion). This case involved an al­
leged unfair method of competition as compared with an unfair practice. An unfair 
method of competition principally condemns antitrust violations and incipient anti­
trust violations while on unfair practice has a far greater sweep. Note also that there 
is no private right of action under the FTCA, and this fact has been used to buttress 
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to disclose a material fact may, therefore, constitute an unfair prac­
tice under the other unfairness criteria without any showing of 
public injury or impact. 
As reflected in various federal and state laws,117 there is a rec­
ognized public policy encouraging affirmative disclosure to achieve 
informed consumer investment decisionmaking. Such policy is vio­
lated under circumstances in which: (1) A material fact about an of­
fering exists; (2) there is a failure to disclose it; (3) the offeree is 
unable to discover or obtain such fact at a reasonable cost; and (4) 
the cost of requiring the offeror to furnish the information is not 
great compared to the economic hann which may be suffered by 
the offeree in making an uninformed purchase decision. 118 In such 
cases, an unfairness claim may lie, depending on the circumstances 
of each case and the seriousness of the policy violation, as well as 
on the degree of injury or loss of money or property.119 The FfC 
has ruled that the failure of franchisors to disclose material facts 
about a franchise offering is an unfair act or practice in violation of 
section 5 of the FTCA. Such conduct, therefore, also violates chap­
ter 93A. 
Notwithstanding this FTC approach, Massachusetts appellate 
courts have commenced limiting the application of the unfairness 
prohibition in cases involving certain businesspersons. 12o When 
both parties appear to have substantial or relatively equal bar­
gaining power, commercial experience, and financial prowess, a 
stronger showing of reprehensible conduct may be required. 121 
Under such circumstances, a plaintiff is more likely to be successful 
if he or she can show that the act or practice is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive or unscrupulous. "The objectionable conduct must at-
the so-called public impact prerequisite. However, the FTC supports the granting of 
a private right of action under FTCA § 5 to enforce its new franchise disclosure rule. 
43 Fed. Reg. 59,723 (1978). 
117. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,635-36 (1978). Compare the Federal Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) (disclosure requirements of and policies sup­
porting informed investment decision making) with the Truth-in-Lending laws. ld. 
§§ 1601-1667(e); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140C, §§ 1-10 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
118. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,635-36 (1978). 
119. In October 1979, ch. 93A, § 9 was amended so that consumer plaintiffs 
need only show injury caused by the unlawful conduct. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
93A, § 9 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). Businesspersons suing under § 11 must still show 
loss of money or property. 1979 Mass. Acts ch. 406. 
120. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 79 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 2043, 2050, 
396 N.E.2d 149, 155 (1979). 
121. Id. 
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tain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone in­
ured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce. "122 
This approach may well be sound in cases in which both par­
ties are sufficiently inured to the rough and tumble world of cut­
throat commercial competition. Such "unfettered competition"123 is 
the primary mandate of the antitrust laws which are incorporated 
into chapter 93A under the rubric of "unfair methods of competi­
tion. "124 To accommodate that principle, the ban on unfair acts or 
practices was not primarily designed to protect those who could ad­
equately fend for themselves in the marketplace. Instead, it 
was enacted to protect those who could not. According to the 
FTC, unsophisticated buyers of capital business offerings need and 
are entitled to receive greater protection than seasoned commercial 
manipulators. 125 In unfairness cases involving only experienced 
businessmen, perhaps a showing of "rascality" or particularly repre­
hensible conduct should be required, taking into consideration the 
reasonable expectations of hardened commercial participants. Such 
an approach, however, would be unso,lmd if applied to the conduct 
of a seasoned commercial operator in dealings with an unsophistica­
ted buyer of a franchise. 
Taken together, recent Massachusetts and FTC interpretations 
vividly point out the flexibility of the unfairness prohibition. It is 
not subject to hard and fast rules. In most instances, the facts did 
dictate the conclusion even though an exact standard was lacking. 
Certain conduct may be unfair as to one plaintiff, but not necessa­
rily as to another. An inflexible standard should not be applied, nor 
is one necessarily desirable. As with the duty to disclose, the duty 
to deal fairly varies from case to case depending on the capabilities 
and reasonable expectations of the parties. Until the courts have 
fleshed out the skeleton of the unfairness doctrine, each case will 
depend upon its own facts and must be decided on the basis of all 
the relevant circumstances. 
Deception. Failure to disclose material facts may constitute a 
deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5 of the FTCA.126 
122. Id. Deceitful intent will successfully ground a claim under ch. 93A, § 11 
Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 79 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 2043, 2050, 396 N.E.2d 149, 
155 (1979). See Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Killeen, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129,384 N.E.2d 
1231 (1979) (state of mind at the time of the commission of the act is relevant to an 
inquiry of unfairness). 
123. See notes 10, 65 & 66 supra. 
124. Id. 
125. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,624-27 (1978). 
126. Id. at 59,636-37. 
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Because the deception analysis differs from the unfairness analysis, 
problems of proof in the latter case may be more difficult. An 
offeror's failure to disclose material information about an offering is 
deceptive if in the absence of disclosure, the offeree may reason­
ably believe a material fact to be significantly different from actual­
ity.127 If a venture is imbued with negative aspects which are as 
likely to occur as not, it would be deceptive for the offeror not to 
disclose this when offering the venture for investment. The same 
applies to the offer for sale of a product if affirmative disclosure is 
needed to avoid misleading the offeree as to important product at­
128 Intributes such as origin, composition and prior use. Massa­
chusetts, the analysis is simpler. The statute is violated on decep­
tion grounds if there is failure to disclose any fact which may have 
influenced the buyer not to enter the transaction. 129 Of course, 
such failure also must have legally caused the injury or loss of 
money or property. 130 
When an offered product or venture carries implied represen­
tations of function, status or affiliation which create corresponding 
assumptions in the offeree, it is deceptive not to disclose factual 
matters which would tend to rebut such assumptions. 13l These 
bear directly on the risks associated with the venture, rather than 
the lack thereof implied by the failure to disclose. Because a failure 
to disclose such material facts may mislead an offeree as to the true 
risk or value of an offering, such failure constitutes a deceptive act 
or practice under section 5 of the FTCA.132 
V. ApPLICABILITY OF THE RULE TO COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS EXCLUSIVE OF FRANCHISING 
Since franchise offerings are similar to other commercial pro­
posals, the FTC Rule and its accompanying interpretations may be 
127. Query whether a reasonableness standard is appropriate. The duty to dis­
close should fluctuate inversely with the varying degree of sophistication of the per­
ceiver of a representation. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). See 
note 131 infra. 
128. Stolarcyk v. Doug Russell, Inc., No. 1013 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977). A prod­
uct claim may also be deceptive if it "fails to disclose facts necessary to dissipate 
false assumptions likely to arise in light of representations actually made." FTC v. 
Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d 708, 716 (9th Cir. 1976). 
129. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(g) (1979); 20 C.M.R. tit. 940, § 3.05 (1978). 
130. Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 369 Mass. 795,343 N.E.2d 375 (1976). 
131. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). It is safest for the 
commercial operator to act as though the consumer/entrepreneur with whom he is 
dealing falls within the ambit of the "ignorant, unthinking and the credulous." 
Charles of the Ritz, Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). 
132. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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legally applicable to such nonfranchise cases. Therefore, whether 
or not commercial activity involves franchising, the FTC Rule's 
teachings and its underlying policies can be used to assist business 
entities in achieving chapter 93A compliance. 
Informational imbalance frequently exists between contracting 
parties. One party may be at a distinct negotiating disadvantage 
because of a lack of necessary information or access to the sources 
of such information. If this is accompanied by a financial disadvan­
tage, the need for disclosure in conformity with the FTC Rule may 
come into play. Other sources of disparity can be based on the 
availability of expert advice, temporal factors, and empirical experi­
ence. Under those circumstances, it is immaterial whether the of­
fering is for the sale of a fast food franchise, a piece of heavy or of­
fice equipment, a donut shop or a vehicle for business purposes. 
To avoid unfair or deceptive conduct, the seller should be able to 
provide substantiation for all claims and should make meaningful 
disclosure. 
For every significant business investment, an equivalent risk 
of loss contingency can develop. This contingency gives rise to a 
need for information and protection similar to that required by the 
FTC Rule for the potential franchisee. The offeree should be given 
information on: the background of the persons with whom he or 
she is dealing; their experience in the particular commercial area 
involved; whether their history is satisfactory financially, commer­
cially and litigiously; the initial or recurrent costs involved in the 
offering; whether any other items must be acquired for the offered 
item to work properly as contemplated and whether such items 
may only be obtained through particular sources; whether consid­
eration is paid to the offeror by third parties as a result of the 
offeree's doing business with such parties; whether the offeror pro­
vides financing and, if so, its terms; whether there are contractual 
or other restrictions on the offeree's use of the item offered and, if 
'so, what they are; and whether training in the use or operation of 
the item is necessary or available and, if so, at what cost. 133 
All material information of this nature should be made avail­
able to an offeree so that a sound investment decision may be 
made. Even when sophisticated commercial entities of relatively 
equal bargaining power contemplate business with each other, such 
information also would be required for analysis prior to consumma­
tion of an important transaction. It should not matter whether the 
133. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (1979). 
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offeror is selling franchises, business opportunities, services or 
property. Under circumstances in which one party is at a distinct 
financial and informational disadvantage, disclosure by the party 
with the advantage would materially reduce chapter 93A liability 
exposure. Marketing and operating policies can and should remain 
competitive and sound when one complies with this imperative. 
A. Sale of Tangible Property 
For maximum protection, material representations should be 
made in the manner set forth in the FTC Rule and its guide­
lines. 134 This can be illustrated where a "small" businessperson 
needs a computer or copy machine for use in his or her business. 
As with the purchase of a franchise, this businessperson needs sub­
stantial, detailed information to make a rational investment deci­
sion. For example, the offeror should be prepared to explain ade­
quately the advantages and disadvantages of leasing and buying. 
While leasing may be more profitable for the seller, if there are 
reasons why a purchase may be more attractive to the buyer, these 
reasons should be disclosed. Normally, there should be disclosure 
of useful life, resale value, depreciability and other tax advantages, 
costs, energy efficiencies, and performance information. 
Performance claims should be made with reasonable availabil­
ity of substantiation and with sound bases in fact.135 They bear on 
the ultimate value of an offering as it relates to the business profits 
which may be earned by the offeree. For this reason, the perfor­
mance claim is typical of other important representations which 
may have to be made. As a matter of marketplace fairness, con­
sumers must be able to rely on performance claims for meaningful 
comparison shopping. Usually, it would be prohibitively expensive 
to obtain independent business evaluation by an expert. 
Making an affirmative product claim in advertising is deceptive 
and unfair to consumer entrepreneurs if there is no reasonable ba­
sis for it. 136 This rule should apply in business outside the context 
of franchising and advertising. 137 An economic gamble, which is 
created by the offeror's activity, is involved in relying on an 
offeror's affirmative product claim. There is relatively minimal cost 
to the offeror to have and make available such substantiation, as 
134. Id. § 436, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614 (1978). 
135. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,632 (1973). 
136. In re ... Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972). 
137. Id. Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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compared with the losses which would impact offerees in the 
absence of disclosure. Thus, economic fairness dictates that the 
substantiation and disclosure obligation be imposed on offerors. 
Earnings representations associated with property offerings are no 
different. The marketplace goals of fair dealing and competition 
would be well served if offerors satisfied these obligations in good 
faith and with due diligence. 
The same rationale applies to failure to disclose material facts 
outside the franchising context. A product claim would be unfair 
and deceptive if misleading due to failure to disclose facts neces­
sary to dissipate misleading assumptions. 13S For example, if it is 
reasonable to expect that a refund will be made under certain cir­
cumstances and in fact the opposite is true, such fact should not be 
omitted prior to acceptance of an offer. This also applies if delivery 
of a product will be unreasonably delayed or if delivery in the 
quantity or quality reasonably expected is not forthcoming. 
B. Sale of Services 
The FTC Rule and its teachings would seem to apply to the 
purchase of services139 from a consulting, legal, accounting, credit 
investigation or similar organization. Representations should be 
based on fact and substantiation should be available. The analogy is 
particularly close since such service companies provide "know 
how" and methods of operation comparable to the offering made by 
franchisors to prospective franchisees. The exact nature and extent 
of the services to be provided should be fully explained and re­
duced to writing. 
For example, if an attorney has been retained to represent a 
business client in business litigation, it is the attorney's duty to in­
form the client of his or her policies regarding a variety of matters 
including: The basis for payment, for example, hourly rate or con­
tingent fee or by some other method; limitations on the client's 
ability to resolve the dispute without the attorney's consent; limita­
tions on the work which the client may expect to be performed by 
the attorney, such as whether representation of the client on ap­
peal is or is not included; the manner in which costs will be paid; 
and any credit terms that may be given. 
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,636 (1978). See Heller v. Silverbranch Const. Corp., 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 332 N.E.2d 1065, 1070; accord, In re J.B. Williams Co., 68 
F.T.C. 481, 485 (1965). 
139. See Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96,360 N.E.2d 870 (1977). 
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Trial attorneys who are engaged for defense often render ser­
vices on a time basis and are unable to estimate accurately the total 
amount of work to be done and its cost. When giving clients a 
"best estimate" of the time and costs involved, the client's under­
standing of the representations and the fact that there is no assur­
ance as to the total fee should be carefully documented. 
In addition to price related representations, the attorney 
should inform the client of facts concerning his or her background 
and experience, if it is material. Failure to disclose important facts, 
such as that the attorney had never previously conducted a trial or 
litigated a business dispute, could be actionable since such facts 
may have had the tendency to influence the prospective client not 
to enter into the attorney-client relationship.14o Assuming disclo­
sure of such facts, the price for the attorney's services would prob- . 
ably be adjusted accordingly or the client would not enter the 
transaction. 
In Massachusetts as well as in the other states which have en­
acted "Little FTC Acts," regulation of unfairness and deception in 
the offering of commercial services is advancing rapidly. The 
attorney-client situation was posited as an example of the rendering 
of unfranchised commercial services in cases in which compliance 
with the FTC Rule's teachings would serve to lower exposure un­
der chapter 93A. Similar benefits would accrue to those offering a 
variety of other commercial services. 
This can be illustrated by certain Massachusetts decisions un­
der chapter 93A in cases not involving franchising. For example, 
just as it has been found unlawful for franchisors to exact unfair 
contractual advantages and to misrepresent the nature of services 
or obligations to be performed, similar conduct has already been 
held unlawful in Massachusetts outside the context of franchising. 
In one case, it was held unfair to exact a contractual charge for the 
transfer of a mobile home space from one tenant to another when 
nothing of value was given in exchange. 141 In another case, the 
court held that chapter 93A was violated for failure to disclose con­
spicuously a noncancellation clause in small print on the reverse 
side of a contract.142 In a third case,143 it was held that chapter 
140. 20 C.M.H. tit. 940, § 3.16 (1978); 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(g) (1979). 
141. Commonwealth v. Decotis, 366 Mass. 234, 241, 316 N.E.2d 748, 755 
(1974). 
142. Badaracco v. Donahue Trailer Sales, 7 MASS. LAW WEEKLY 482-83 (Dist. 
Ct. of Newton, 1979) (Chernoff, J.). 
143. Dodd v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1540, 365 
N.E.2d 802 (1977). 
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93A applied to bad faith conduct rendered by an insurance com­
pany in failing to respond adequately to, investigate, service 
promptly or settle customer claims notwithstanding that a statute 
had been previously enacted to regulate unfairness and deception 
in the insurance industry.144 If bad faith is shown, the conduct is 
conceptually no different from wrongfully failing to satisfy contrac­
tual obligations promised to franchisees to supply products, ser­
vices or training timely and reasonably. 
Additionally, claims of unfair competition, unfair methods of 
competition and antitrust violations fall within the prohibitions of 
both statutes. 145 Contractual restrictions extinguishing a fran­
chisee's freedom to set prices have been held to violate the anti­
trust laws146 and chapter 93A. The same is true for express re­
quirements that "tied" products be purchased from the franchisor 
or its designee if the franchisee desires to purchase the "tying" 
product, for example, the franchise. 147 The applicability of these 
anticompetitive rules is not limited to franchising and is in fact 
broadly applicable to a variety of commercial situations. Similarly, 
commercial bribery148 and payment of undisclosed kickbacks149 to 
third parties, including franchisors, have been proscribed under 
section 5 of the FTCA. 
The policies underlying the federal and Massachusetts statutes 
144. Id. at 1547, 365 N.E.2d at 805; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D (West 
1958). But cf. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2091, 
2096,393 N.E.2d 376,377 (1979) (remedies given motor vehicle dealer or franchisee by 
ch. 93B are the only remedies available and preempt application of ch. 93A). 
145. FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 
316 (1966); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 
F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1974); Chicken Unltd. v. 
Bockover, 873 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-l (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978), rev'd 
on other grounds, 374 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In re Howard Johnson 
Co., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,577, at 21,685 (F.T.C. 
1979); In re Chock Full of Nuts Corp., 83 F.T.C. 575 (1973). 
146. See note 145 supra. Compare the pricing claims brought under ch. 93A in 
Massachusetts v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 868 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-4 
(D. Mass. 1978) with In re Levi Strauss & Co., 901 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) D-l (Mass. Super. Ct. 1978). 
147. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); See H. BROWN, supra note 
57, at 281-368 (discusses protection afforded to franchisees by the federal antitrust 
iaws). For a most recent and cogent discussion of tying violations under the anti­
trust laws examine Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., [1979] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 
11 62,869, at 79,019 (7th Cir. 1979). 
148. American Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 
1939). 
149. In re Barton's Candy Corp., 79 F.T.C. 101, 103-04 (1971). See Virginia v. 
Padgett, 930 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-13 & 14 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1979); 
16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1(11), .2(i) (1979). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 59,657-59 (1978). 
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are nearly identical. Parallel enforcement of these statutes by the 
public and private sectors is proceeding purposefully. With respect 
to consumers and businesspersons, and in franchising as well as 
other commercial arenas, there are fundamental public policies to 
encourage fair dealing and informed business decisionmaking. 
Strong support for these policies is evident from chapter 93A's gen­
erous provisions for multiple damages, costs (including experts' 
fees),150 and attorneys' fees, both to encourage private enforcement 
and to deter violators. Informed consumers and businesspersons 
are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free market 
economy. 151 Massachusetts courts have been strengthening such 
policies by following the legislative mandate to give FIC interpre­
tations due respect in interpreting section 2(a) of chapter 93A.152 
VI. COMPLIANCE SUGGESTIONS 
The foregoing FIC formulations of the unfairness and decep­
tion doctrines can provide meaningful guidance for commercial op­
erators. Financial exposure under chapter 93A can be quite sub­
stantial. Persons engaged in commerce should strongly consider 
adjusting business practices in order to achieve compliance. Many 
varieties of practices can be carefully developed and implemented 
to assist in avoiding liability and in minimizing damages. The 
ensuing good will among consumers and other businesspersons 
should be of substantial benefit. 
The cost and benefit of such development and implementation 
must be weighed against the ever present spectre of multiple dam­
ages, attorneys' fees and class suits under chapter 93A. Moreover, 
because there is no adequate predefinition of what is or is not un­
fair, these risks are increased. If a businessperson evaluates a busi­
ness practice incorrectly and that practice is later determined to be 
unfair or deceptive, such person will have acted contrary to public 
policy, often with no intention of doing so. Furthermore, if such 
person's business involved franchising, that unfairness determina­
tion would now have to be disclosed to any potential franchisee 
150. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11 (West 1972). See Linthicum v. 
Archambault, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2661, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979). 
151. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,635 n.95 (1978) (citing MacIntyre & Von Brand, Unfair 
Methods of Competition as an Evolving Concept-Prelude to Consumerism, 44 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 597 (1970)). 
152. For a brief summary of unfair and deceptive practices as well as a recent 
summary of substantive and procedural rules under ch. 93A see PREPARATION AND 
TRIAL OF A CH. 93A CASE (1979) (published for seminars presented by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys). 
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pursuant to the FTC Rule. The repercussions from such disclosure 
could be disastrous and should be avoided. 
Historically, businesspersons have often relied on the direct 
profit factor, the lack of probable detection, the cost of litigation, 
legal technicalities and similar defensive factors. 153 But in real eco­
nomic terms, both society and the individual businessperson 
should fare better when transactions and methods of dealing are 
fair, honest and reasonable. Such a value judgment finds support in 
the increasing formulation of policies and standards for commercial 
conduct embodied in laws, such as the "Little FTC Acts" and the 
FTC Rule. The old adage of "buyer beware" has been completely 
changed. Now it is the seller who must be very careful. The fol­
lowing suggestions are, therefore, offered to aid businesspersons in 
complying with these laws in the sale of business opportunities and 
in other comparably important commercial transactions. 
The seller should carefully measure the levels of perception 
and sophistication of the potential buyer. Duties to deal fairly and 
to disclose fully necessarily fluctuate with the capacity of each 
offeree. A good rule of thumb for determining the capacity of a 
representation to deceive, is to estimate the impression a represen­
tation is likely to have on the general populace. 154 A higher duty 
would be in order when a representation or practice is directed at 
an especially susceptible or unsophisticated audience. Further, the 
setting in which an offer is made should not be prone to abusive or 
exploitative marketing practices. Marketing texts and other busi­
ness materials can be consulted to determine the most suitable at­
mosphere. 
The seller should provide a prospective offeree with all infor­
mation needed to make an informed investment decision, including 
disclosure of the applicable categories of information required by 
the FTC Rule. The seller should also comply with the disclosure 
standards of the Attorney General's regulations. 155 The information 
may include opinions of accountants, attorneys, and in particular, 
those of other consumer entrepreneurs who had been offered and 
who accepted the venture. If available, both good and bad opinions 
should be presented. To· rectifY the informational imbalance, the 
seller should implement a system to assure that all pertinent and 
153. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,622-27 (1978). 
154. Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 892 (9th Cir. 1960). See also notes 26 & 71 
supra. 
155. See notes 17 & 75 supra. 
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truthful information which could have been provided was in fact 
provided. This might be buttressed through the use of signed re­
ceipts and authorized tape recordings. 
Sellers should avoid exploitative marketing practices which 
emphasize playing on the instant success mentality. They should 
not use alluring phrases and come-ons such as "be your own boss" 
and "this is a lifetime opportunity." Any such emphasis should be 
strongly penalized, especially where the offeree is unsophisticated. 
A company should warn its salespeople, particularly when commis­
sion sales are involved. It is often necessary to police sales person­
nel, since the desire to make a sale and earn a commission can 
overcome the will to maintain honesty and openness. 
Sellers ca~ also screen out the ignorant, naive, inexperienced 
and overall losers who would be unlikely to handle the transaction 
successfully. These are the individuals who are most likely to come 
back with outrageous demands to resolve their problems. De­
pending on the sophistication level of proposed buyers, the seller 
should adopt sufficient methods and standards commensurate with 
the difficulty of succeeding in the venture and the statistical likeli­
hood of success. Educational or vocational requirements may be 
important tools to achieve such goals. 
Sellers would do well to require that the offeree be repre­
sented and given an opinion by competent experts. If analysis of fi­
nancial statements is involved, the opinion of a licensed or certified 
public accountant should be required for the offeree's benefit. It 
may be advisable to suggest the need for a business consultant or 
retail marketing analyst. The seller should offer clear and under­
standable tenns, with a recommendation to obtain competent legal 
advice. Realistically, such a program must assume that the seller 
has formulated a worthwhile venture that can sustain such scrutiny. 
The best way to avoid the risks presented by chapter 93A is to de­
vise sound products or service offerings and to administer them 
properly. 
Procedures can be very important. For example, the seller 
should use and honor simple, understandable forms, manuals, and 
covenants. The buyer should be given as much "decision" time as 
would reasonably be necessary to understand and decide upon a 
transaction, including sufficient time for his advisors to review the 
transaction. The seller should avoid all forms of excessive pressure, 
particularly in the temporal sense. 
If the seller proposes refund and additional or alternative war­
ranty policies, they should be clearly represented and then imple­
mented in good faith both as to procedure and substance. A gener­
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ous refund factor could well be considered as another cost of doing 
business. At the least, this would enable the seller to tender sub­
stantial repayment as a means· of avoiding exemplary damages and 
attorneys' fees. Moreover, if the offeror has done a good job of 
devising the product or service offered, repurchase should not 
present a problem. If the product is a good one, then presumably 
it could be resold at a moderate discount in the normal course of 
business. If major deficiencies exist, the prospective buyer may 
have had little or no opportunity to obtain the benefit of the bar­
gain. 
Commercial operators who enter into potentially long-term re­
lationships with prospective entrepreneurs can do a great deal to 
establish a solid, financially rewarding business relationship from 
which all can derive benefit. Compliance with these suggestions 
and the policies underlying the statute should help to achieve such 
results. If and when the seller must defend itself, it will be invalu­
able to rely on a business system designed with fairness than to de­
fend one designed on barely satisfYing contractual or statutory 
technicalities. Both under chapter 93A and before a parochially ori­
ented jury, provable justification may provide the only meaningful 
defense. 
No matter how fair, honest or reasonable the commercial op­
erator may have been, some offerees will not succeed in their ven­
tures. Whether it is their fault or that of the commercial operator, 
some entrepreneurs will seek restitution from the major company. 
Such behavior must be anticipated. The cost of dealing with such 
disputes should be contemplated and projected. A substantial re­
serve should be set aside to process and resolve these disputes on 
a short term basis. As a practical matter, it is often too expensive 
and too risky to defend these claims unless there is an exceptional 
record of full disclosure and solid substantiation. If the claim seems 
bona fide, chapter 93A encourages settlement. 156 The overreaching 
plaintiff who rejects an offer of settlement in the range of single 
damages will find no sympathy in the courts and will lose the claim 
for exemplary damages. 157 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The FTC Rule is an important legal formulation of law and 
policy in the area of commercial unfairness and deception. At least 
156. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11 (West 1972). 
157. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9 (West 1972); Kohl v. Silver 
Lake Motors, Inc., 369 Mass. 795, 343 N.E.2d 375 (1976). 
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in the franchising context, the history of abuses showed evidence of 
the need for full disclosure. Disclosure will reduce the severity and 
frequency of consumer injury resulting from unlawful business op­
portunity offerings. More protection is necessary to cover the on­
going relationship between the well financed, sophisticated, com­
mercial operator as against the small businessperson in order to ef­
fectuate the policies of good faith and fair dealing. Private enforce­
ment of economic regulatory statutes like chapter 93A is the 
primary approach available to consumer entrepreneurs to assure 
such good faith and fair dealing throughout the duration of business 
relationships. 
In addition to exploring the context and meaning of the FfC 
Rule, an effort has been made to show its substantial impact on 
Massachusetts law. The substantive scope of the FTC Rule is vast 
and detailed, providing persuasive authority for broad application. 
Students and users of the statute have been provided with valuable 
interpretations for relatively common business transactions. They 
also have been provided with a guide for understanding the differ­
ences between the unfairness and deception analyses which hereto­
fore had been overlooked. Separate evaluation of the unfairness 
and deception doctrines can aid in the precise formulation of claims 
and defenses. Accordingly, there will be more efficient judicial res­
olution of business disputes. 
Additionally, suggestions have been offered to aid commercial 
operators in complying with the FTC Rule. These suggestions are 
not intended to be exhaustive. Furthermore, both the FTC inter­
pretations and suggestions for compliance should not be viewed as 
applicable only to offerings of business opportunities and similar re­
lationships. The rules regarding deception and unfairness are de­
signed to be flexible to apply to the never ending variety of busi­
ness transactions and relationships which may be contemplated by 
those with entrepreneurial creativity. 
There may be some justifiable complaint over the heavy bur­
dens and expense required for compliance. But failure to meet that 
challenge can result in devastating exposure to exemplary damages. 
Further, the cost of compliance can be spread over an entire busi­
ness operation and passed on to the ultimate purchasers. Those 
subject to chapter 93A are best able fairly to bear the cost of com­
pliance. In any event, they have a legal obligation to comply. In all 
probability, those who comply will benefit from the long-term de­
velopment of the good will of their customers. 
